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A
lthough the United States has run current account
deficits since 1990, those deficits have recently
assumed extraordinary proportions. Between
2004:Q4 and 2005:Q3, the U.S. external deficit has
averaged 6.4 percent of GDP. A current account deficit is
the difference between a country’s imports of goods and
services and the sum of its exports and net factor payments.
Although other macroeconomic factors affect exchange
rates (e.g., differential interest and growth rates), many
economists have suggested that, in the presence of large
current account deficits, the dollar will depreciate. As the
dollar depreciates, the dollar price of foreign goods and
services increases, while the price abroad (in foreign
currency) of U.S. goods and services declines. As a result,
U.S. households and firms buy fewer imported goods,
while foreign households and firms purchase more U.S.
goods. Therefore a depreciating dollar ought to bring the
current account back toward neutral.1
The chart shows that over the period 2002-04 the real
effective value of the U.S. dollar has depreciated at an
average pace of 4.7 percent per annum. This tendency
reversed in 2005; the real value of the dollar appreciated by
3.6 percent last year. Many commentators have expressed
concerns about the incompatibility between the dollar
U-turn and the current account deficit, predicting dollar
depreciation in 2006.
Why has the dollar appreciated despite the very
large U.S. current account deficit? One factor is
that, over the period 2004-05, the monetary
authorities of a number of developing countries—
mostly in Asia—purchased 269 billion in U.S.
dollar securities. China alone has seen its U.S.
dollar reserves grow by $167 billion, to exceed
$800 billion.2
These Asian governments oppose an uncon-
trolled dollar depreciation for two reasons: (i)
Their huge dollar-denominated reserves expose
them to enormous losses if the dollar depreciates
significantly. A 20 percent dollar depreciation,
for example, would reduce Chinese reserves by
an amount between 2 and 9 percent of the
Chinese GDP and reduce Singapore’s reserves
by between 18 and 25 percent of its GDP. (ii) Uncontrolled
growth of foreign reserves can also cause an excessive
expansion of domestic liquidity, which poses inflation risks.
As a result, many U.S. trading partners have resisted
the weakening dollar and welcomed 2005 as a break to
an unsustainable trend. A number of Asian countries still
need to implement institutional reforms to prepare them
for domestically driven growth and end their dependence
on export surpluses supported by weak currencies. In July
2005, China took a step in this direction by revaluing the
renminbi’s parity with the dollar by 2.1 percent and simul-
taneously switching from a dollar peg to a managed float-
ing regime in which the parity is determined with reference
to a basket of currencies. The Chinese are implementing
other structural reforms to increase the efficiency of cur-
rency markets and to enable all firms to hedge currency
risks. This seems to herald further reforms that might
re-establish more symmetry in international trade relation-
ships.  If developing Asian economies will persist on the
reforming path, in the long-run the dollar may not have
to bear the entire burden of much needed adjustments in
international current accounts.
—Massimo Guidolin
1 Blanchard, O., Giavazzi, F., and Sa, F., 2005, “The U.S. Current Account and
the Dollar”, NBER Working Paper No. W11137.
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